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When confronted with negative events, such as an argument with our spouse or criticism 
by the boss, oftentimes we engage in mental activity reflecting on these events. Typically, we aim 
to understand why these events occurred, how we contributed to such events, and how to avoid 
them in the future. Despite the adaptive consequences of reflecting on one’s feelings, research 
indicates that persistent thinking about negative feelings may have negative consequences. In the 
context of depression, for instance, such persistent negative thinking, termed “rumination”, has 
been found to be one of the most important risk factors for the development of depressive 
symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Moreover, even in non-depressed, 
healthy individuals, rumination can be observed and also leads to negative cognitive as well as 
affective consequences (Watkins, 2008).  
In this chapter we will discuss rumination as an important self-regulatory strategy. We 
start by introducing some of the basic conceptualizations of rumination where different theories 
have highlighted stable as well as momentary aspects of rumination. Then, we discuss the 
research on the cognitive and biobehavioral consequences of rumination in more detail. In order 
to understand the persistent nature of rumination we will then turn to the psychological 
mechanisms underlying rumination. Finally, we discuss some of the future directions in 
experimental research on rumination including recent innovative approaches to reduce excessive 
rumination. 
1. Definition of rumination 
There are many different conceptualizations of rumination (for a review, see Smith & 
Alloy, 2009). Here we will discuss the main approaches to this concept. One of the most 
dominant theories of rumination is the Response Styles Theory (RST), where rumination is 
conceived as “behaviors and thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms 
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and on the implications of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569). Within this 
definition, several features are important. First, it states that rumination is focused on (depressed) 
mood state instead of certain cognitive themes (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008). Then it mentions the content of rumination to indicate that people try to use it purposefully 
to understand and control their negative affect (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Finally, this 
conceptualization proposes a very close link between rumination and depressive symptoms 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). It is noteworthy that, despite some supportive evidence for each 
of these features, there still is extensive discussion about these features. 
In the RST, rumination can be an intrapersonal process but also a social process where 
individuals engage in ruminative processing together (co-rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
Unlike the RST, in which communicating feelings to others can be considered as a component of 
rumination, other researchers contend that the basic component of rumination is cognitive 
ideation, because it is usually thought that rumination has negative consequences (Giorglo et al., 
2010) while repetitive emotional expressions can sometimes be useful (Derlega et al., 1993). 
Additionally, several models have defined rumination as being part of a pattern of “persistent 
negative thought” where these negative thoughts do not necessarily merely involve thinking 
about negative affect but include also other type of thinking such as anxious anticipation 
(Brosschot, 2010). 
According to RST (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) rumination is considered a trait-like response 
style to distress as research observed stable tendencies in responding with rumination to distress. 
This conceptualization led to the development of measures of trait rumination. The most 
commonly used measure is the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991), a 22-item scale that assesses ruminative responding to sad mood. The RRS has high 
internal consistency and acceptable concurrent validity (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). 
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Factor analysis of this questionnaire revealed two subtypes of rumination; reflective pondering 
and brooding (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Reflective pondering is a more 
adaptive form of rumination that indicates the amount of thinking about potential solutions to 
reduce negative affect, whereas brooding is maladaptive and indicates passively focusing on 
symptoms of distress and on the meaning of those symptoms. This distinction is nowadays 
frequently applied in the literature although in clinically depressed individuals the distinction 
between these two factors is blurred (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2011). 
In contrast to theories that consider rumination as a stable trait, some views proposed that 
rumination is stress-reactive and variable across time (for reviews, see Martin & Tesser, 1996; 
Smith & Alloy, 2009). Indeed, research indicates that meaningful differences can be found 
between trait and state rumination using measures that allow measuring fluctuations in 
rumination. For example, Moberly and Watkins (2008), found that momentary rumination 
(assessed via two items that inquire about the extent to which participants are currently focused 
on their feelings and problems), predicted subsequent negative affect independently from the 
prediction by trait rumination. Other studies found interactive effects of state and trait rumination. 
For instance, state rumination was related to impaired cardiovascular recovery from emotional 
stress, but only among those who are low in trait rumination (e.g., Key, Campbell, Bacon, & 
Gerin, 2008). Moreover, some studies have demonstrated poor stability across time of trait 
rumination (e.g., Kasch, Klein, & Lara, 2001), and recent diary studies have shown significant 
variation in rumination across days and even hours of the day (e.g., Genet & Siemer, 2012; 
Takano & Tanno, 2011). Taken together, these findings support the notion of rumination as a 
variable process where there are separate influences of trait versus state rumination. 
Other contemporary models emphasize the notion that rumination is a transdiagnostic risk 
factor for a variety of disorders, instead of being depression-specific (e.g., Watkins, 2008). This 
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has led to the development of several measures, such as the Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire 
(Mahoney, McEvoy, & Moulds, 2012) and the Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (Ehring et 
al., 2011), that examine repetitive thinking in a wide range of situations instead of focusing 
specifically on negative affect. In different disorders, rumination may take a somewhat different 
form. For instance, in the cognitive model of social phobia, Clark and Wells (1995) suggest that 
the content of rumination is concentrated on social interaction, instead of negative affect 
(Kashdan & Roberts, 2007). In such theories, the notion of rumination is usually used 
interchangeably with that of post-event processing, where socially anxious individuals dwell on 
previous social encounters and failures (Mellings & Alden, 2000). Research has implicated 
repetitive negative thinking not merely in affective disorders but has indicated that rumination 
plays an important role in health and somatic problems such as hypertension (e.g., Brosschot, 
Verkuil, & Thayer, 2010; Gerin et al., 2012). 
 
2. Physiological Aspects of Rumination 
  In recent years there has been marked progress in understanding the underlying 
neurobiological and physiological mechanisms associated with rumination.  
2.1 Neural mechanisms of rumination 
Most research on the neural mechanisms of rumination has been performed on both healthy 
and depressed individuals by having them undergo experimental tasks with emotional or 
self-relevant stimuli. It has been observed that depressed persons show enhanced amygdala 
activity in response to negative stimuli and this is correlated with self-reported measures of 
rumination (Siegle, Carter, & Thase, 2006; Siegle, Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002). 
This finding has been confirmed and refined by another fRMI study showing that the amygdala 
response while up-regulating negative mood was correlated with trait rumination also in healthy 
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controls, thus suggesting that in depressed as well as non-depressed individuals similar neural 
mechanism are involved in repetitive thinking (Ray et al., 2005).  
However, hyperactive amygdala reactivity is by no means the only brain response involved in 
rumination. Cooney, Joorman, Eugène, Dennis, and Gotlib (2010) have demonstrated that a much 
more complex network (perhaps multiple networks) is associated with the tendency to ruminate. In 
that study, depressed individuals who were engaged in rumination showed increased activation in 
important areas, such as the amydgala, the subgenual cortex, the rostral anterior 
cingulate/medioprefrontal cortex, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex, 
and the parahippocampus. This result confirms that rumination recruits a wide range of brain areas 
that are typically involved in emotional processing, self-focus, self-referential thinking, attentional 
control, and autobiographical memory. 
More recently, depressive brooding has become the focus of increasing research. This 
maladaptive form of rumination has been associated with a variety of negative consequences, such 
as both concurrent and future depressive symptoms over 1 year (Treynor et al., 2003; Siegle, 
Moore, & Thase, 2004), therefore the understanding of its specific neural substrate is an important 
area of research. For instance, Berman, Nee, and colleagues (2011) reported that depressed 
individuals with higher brooding scores are characterized by increased spatial variability in the 
activation of the left inferior frontal gyrus. Despite this intriguing finding, such research on 
brooding (and rumination) has been carried out in mixed samples consisting of both depressed and 
non-depressed individuals, so that the related findings could have been confounded by features 
specific for clinical depression, such as impaired attentional control. Consequently, Vanderhasselt, 
Kühn, and De Raedt (2011) tried to bridge this gap by selecting healthy brooders with no history of 
previous depressive episodes. This study demonstrated that those with higher levels of depressive 
brooding reported also increased activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex when 
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successfully disengaging from negative information. In sum, this study shows that depressive 
rumination impacts specifically on emotional task performance and is associated with neural 
substrates that can be distinguished from depression. 
Parallel to investing the neural basis of rumination during task, researchers have 
increasingly focused their attention on the activity of the brain when not in a task context (i.e., 
resting state) and an associated neural network that has raised much interest (Broyd et al., 2009). 
This neural network, termed Default Mode Network (DMN), has been documented to be highly 
active during rest (Raichle et al., 2001) as well as to be associated with many higher order 
functions, such as self-referential thinking (Northoff et al., 2006). Because of this, it has been 
proposed that the DMN could shed new light on depression and rumination (Marchetti, Koster, 
Sonuga-Barke, & De Raedt, 2012). Indeed, specific DMN brain areas have consistently been 
associated with rumination. Berman, Peltier, and colleagues (2011), for instance, reported that 
during rest, temporal synchronization (i.e. functional connectivity) between the subgenual cortex 
and the posterior cingulate correlated with higher levels of trait rumination. Interestingly, this 
correlation was driven only by brooding scores, but not by reflective pondering.  
2.2 Cortisol levels and rumination 
 Stress is a psychobiological reaction demanding cognitive, emotional, and physiological 
adjustments to threats or challenges to one’s well-being. When an individual faces a stressor, such 
as receiving harsh critic from the boss, a complex sequence of adjustments takes place to prepare 
the body for responding. Once the stressor has disappeared it is important that the body returns to 
baseline (homeostasis). In fact, physiological activation and subsequent return to homeostasis is 
regulated by the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis (HPA) by releasing cortisol, a stress-related 
steroid hormone.  
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As rumination is continuously reactivating mental representations related to negative 
affect and stress, rumination could elicit and maintain inappropriately high levels of cortisol. 
Despite this straightforward hypothesis, the extant literature on the relationship between 
rumination and cortisol proves to be more complicated and we will discuss some of the key 
findings here (Zoccola & Dickerson, 2012). State rumination after stress manipulation in the 
laboratory has been consistently associated with increased levels of cortisol (Byrd-Craven, Geary, 
Rose, & Ponzi, 2008; Zoccola, Dickerson, & Zaldivar, 2008), whereas the link between trait 
rumination and stress-related hormone reaction is unclear. In fact, it has been reported that the 
association between trait rumination and cortisol can be positive (Roger & Najarian, 1998), 
negative (Zoccola et al., 2008), or absent (van Santen et al., 2011). It is also noteworthy that 
studies examining rumination in the context of depression oftentimes failed to find a positive 
relation between depression-related rumination and cortisol response. Instead they showed no or 
a negative association (Kuehner, Holzhauer, & Huffziger, 2007; Young & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2001). On the contrary, a robust positive relationship has been documented between cortisol levels 
and stress-related (state) rumination (Byrd-Craven et al., 2008; Roger & Najarian, 1998; Zoccola 
et al., 2008). 
 Taken together, these findings show that differential effects of rumination on cortisol 
levels can be detected, if the state vs. trait specificity or the topic of the repetitive thinking is 
taken into account. In studies showing evidence for a positive relation, rumination mainly has an 
effect on the duration of the stress response rather than elevating initial reactivity (Byrd-Craven et 
al., 2008). Although it is tempting to claim a causal influence of perseverative thinking on the 
HPA axis, alternative models that entail mutual influences have been proposed as well (Zoccola 
& Dickerson, 2012) and empirical data for strong conclusions is lacking. 
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3. Affective and Cognitive Consequences of Rumination 
There is an extensive literature on the consequences of rumination. Where one could be 
inclined to think that negative affect elicits a reflective response that could enhance insight into 
the nature of one’s negative feelings and problems, most research indicates that rumination is 
mainly associated with negative consequences. Here, especially depressive brooding – the 
evaluative and passive style of focusing on negative feelings and problems – has been associated 
with negative consequences. We will briefly describe these consequences below. 
A major negative consequence of rumination is enhanced negative affect. Studies where 
rumination is induced in participants show this as an important short term consequence 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). Experimental studies testing the short-term effects of 
rumination have typically used the rumination induction procedure developed by 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993). This procedure increases ruminative thinking and has been 
shown to heighten negative affect and prolong negative mood in individuals with heightened 
depression-risk (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993) and in 
clinically depressed participants (Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Lavender & Watkins, 2004; Watkins 
& Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). It is specifically the negative, evaluative, and 
judgmental type of self-focused attention that is considered maladaptive (Rude, Maestas, & Neff, 
2007). Importantly, negative affect is also considered an important trigger of rumination (see 
Smith & Alloy, 2009 for a review). Hence, there seems to be a mutually reinforcing link between 
rumination and negative affect.  
At the long term, affective consequences of rumination are depressive symptoms such as 
sustained negative affect. Numerous studies have demonstrated that rumination is associated 
concurrently with depressive symptoms (Treynor et al., 2003) and, more importantly, 
prospectively with the onset (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), severity (Just & Alloy, 1997; 
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Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and duration (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) of depression. 
Furthermore, recovery from depression has been linked to rumination where higher levels of 
rumination predict slower and incomplete recovery (Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Schmaling, 
Dimidjian, Katon, & Sullivan, 2002). Thus rumination is considered one of the key cognitive risk 
factors for depression. 
In addition to the affective consequences, rumination also has several unwanted cognitive 
consequences. There are a number of studies showing that inducing rumination hampers problem 
solving and task performance (Watkins & Brown, 2002). This led Watkins and Brown (2002) to 
propose that state rumination leads to cognitive impairment by overloading limited executive 
resources. This effect seems especially pronounced in individuals with elevated depression scores, 
since Philippot and Brutoux (2008) found that a rumination induction made it more difficult for 
dysphoric (but not for nondysphoric) participants to ignore distracting words in a Stroop task. In 
this context it is also interesting that individuals high in trait rumination perform less well on the  
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, which suggests lower levels of cognitive flexibility (Davis & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). 
This brief overview of the consequences of rumination indicates that rumination is a 
problematic self-regulatory strategy. This begs the question which processes contribute to 
excessive rumination. 
 
3. Why Ruminate? 
 In addressing the question of factors contributing to rumination it is useful to distinguish 
between voluntary rumination and involuntary rumination. That is, within and across individuals 
parts of rumination are clearly linked to intentionally trying to understand negative affect and 
events occurring, whereas at other moments rumination occurs unintentionally (according to 
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some even unconsciously; Brosschot, 2010). Different theories of rumination have been proposed 
to account for these different aspects of rumination.  
In the broad context of self-regulation, the Goal Progress Theory (Martin, Tesser, & 
Mcintosh, 1993) proposes that it is the failure to progress towards higher order goals that initiates 
rumination. From this perspective, rumination is strictly linked to both motivation and the self. In 
fact, an assumption of the theory is that the more central to one’s self-concept the unattained goal 
is (for instance, finding a romantic partner), the greater and more pressing the ruminative 
response is in turn. In line with this, relief from rumination is possible only when one attains the 
goal, gets clear feedback about sufficient progress to it, or disengages from it (Martin & Tesser, 
2006). 
Alternatively, in the self-regulatory executive function (S-REF) theory, rumination is 
generated when people find that their present state is different from their intended one (Wells & 
Mathews, 1996). The maintenance of rumination is explained by overly positive metacognitive 
beliefs about rumination being a helpful strategy to understand and reduce negative affect 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001). 
Both theories described above consider rumination as an intentional and voluntary 
process. Yet, individuals characterized by high levels of rumination find it extremely difficult to 
stop when rumination is interfering with their functioning. Several information processing 
theories have been put forward to explain this observation. 
A key proposal in information-processing theories is that individuals with high levels of 
rumination have difficulties disengaging attention from negative information or expelling 
negative information from working memory (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Koster et al., 2011). 
These models propose that information processing is biased to favor negative material in high 
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ruminators at the expense of other information which hinders more adaptive emotion regulation 
strategies such as cognitive reappraisal. There is substantial support for these models, where 
several studies found attentional bias as well as biases in the updating of working memory in high 
ruminators (Bernblum & Mor, 2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Koster et al., 2013). However, 
there have been a substantial number of studies where cognitive impairments were observed in 
high ruminators in the absence of emotional material (e.g., De Lissnyder et al., 2011). The latter 
finding suggests that cognitive impairments are more broad and not necessarily emotion-specific 
which demands a theoretical explanation. 
Recently, Whitmer and Gotlib (2012) proposed a new model called the attentional scope 
model of rumination which provides an integrated way to explain the consequences of 
rumination. The basic assumption is that trait ruminators have a narrower attentional scope than 
non-ruminators. More specifically, they postulate that individuals who have a narrow attentional 
scope when not in a negative mood will show a high tendency to ruminate, because their 
attentional resources will be constrained to a limited set of focal thoughts. In some circumstances, 
such a constrained attentional focus is adaptive when for instance concentrating on homework. 
However, in conditions of distress, negative mood will narrow attentional scope and, as a result, 
magnify focusing on a single feeling or problem, while ignoring much external information. In 
contrast, individuals who have a broad attentional scope tend to ruminate less even when they are 
in a depressed mood, because their attentional scope will be broad enough to protect them from 
becoming absorbed by a focal feeling or problem.  
It is noteworthy that, different from other models, this model posits that trait ruminators 
should exhibit a narrower attentional scope independent of mood. Besides, other than biasing by 
negative information (Joormann, 2010; Koster et al., 2011), individuals could focus their 
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attention on all kinds of information when it is relevant to the task (Friedman & Förster, 2010). 
So, instead of inhibiting the negative information, this model posits that trait ruminators could 
maintain the relevant information but will have difficulties inhibiting this information when the 
situation changes and the information is not relevant any more. Despite the absence of direct tests 
of this hypothesis, many of the findings at the level of working memory and perception can also 
be explained by the attentional scope model of rumination. 
The information-processing explanations of depressive rumination are also supported by 
some of the neurobiological findings. In a recent fMRI study (Foland-Ross et al., 2013) an 
emotional working memory task was administered in a sample with major depression to elucidate 
neural correlates of difficulties in cognitive control. In the depressed individuals, the dorsal 
anterior cingulate and parietal and bilateral insular cortices were activated significantly more 
when negative words had to be removed from working memory. In contrast, nondepressed 
participants exhibited stronger neural activations in these regions for positive than for negative 
material. Surprisingly, no unique correlations were observed with rumination but this may have 
been due to high levels of depression which are strongly confounded with rumination. These 
findings suggest that different neural mechanisms are involved in expelling negative material in 
depression where future studies should further investigate whether and how this contributes to 
rumination. 
4. Future directions in the study of rumination 
There are a number of research lines that appear particularly promising to enhance 
understanding and modification of rumination. Here, a major challenge is how to clarify and 
understand biobehavioral cascades in relation to rumination. There is some research examining 
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the psychophysiological consequences of rumination which shows that rumination and sustained 
processing of emotional information causes decreased ability to recover from emotional stimuli. 
Such effects have been supported by studies measuring vagal tone, heart rate variability, and the 
cortisol response (see Siegle & Thayer, 2004). Provided that rumination is associated with 
prolonged stress it is interesting that recent research also suggests an important role of rumination 
in influencing physical illness where, for instance, rumination plays an important role in recovery 
from chemotherapy (Berman et al., in press). More broadly, provided that depression is 
associated with inflammation (Berk et al., 2013), it would be highly interesting to better 
understand the long term biological consequences of rumination as prolonged stress associated 
with rumination could contribute to inflammation. 
Moreover, it is likely that there are dynamic cascades between the cognitive and 
biobehavioral consequences of rumination that deserve more fine-grained investigation. Such 
cascades could occur in several ways. It is possible that when individuals ruminate and 
experience increased levels of stress that experiencing stress can give rise to more ruminative 
thought (“why am I feeling this way?”). In addition, rumination is also associated with reduced 
levels of activity (several items of the RRS for instance refers to withdrawal from social contact 
to analyse feelings). By social withdrawal, rumination could both lower activity levels where 
isolation may magnify the focus on problems and their emotional impact.  
Below we describe several approaches that could shed more light on such cascading and 
dynamic effects associated with rumination. 
4.1 Dynamic systems approach 
Despite that most of the theories center around explaining the initiation and persistence of 
rumination, a clear and empirical way to test temporary fluctuations in rumination is to a large 
15 
 
extent absent. What is lacking is indeed a conceptual frame that may efficaciously account for 
fluctuations of ruminative thinking and its co-occurrence with negative mood, self-focus, and 
motivational states (Smith & Alloy, 2009).  
In that regard, a powerful tool is offered by Dynamic Systems Theory (DST), which 
explicitly aims at capturing individual and group-level trajectories (Kelso, 1995). DST is a 
metatheoretical framework that, originally derived from mathematics and physics, has 
successfully been applied in many domains where time is an importance variable, such as 
developmental and clinical psychology (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Granic & Hollentesin, 2003). 
Within the DST framework, it is possible to represent a certain phenomenon as a set of elements 
co-varying over time (i.e., system) and, in turn, capitalize on the enormous amount of information 
that dynamics provide. Concepts, like “state space”, “attractor”, and “repellor” are usually 
adopted to analyze temporal dynamics.  
A state space is a schematic map where all the possible states of a system are included. 
For instance, by representing simultaneously both state mood (i.e. positive, neutral, or negative) 
on the x-axis and attention (i.e. internally-oriented vs. externally-oriented) on the y-axis, the 
two-dimension system would consist of six possible states (e.g., positive-internal, 
neutral-internal, etc.). Hence, a single subject (or group) trajectory could be shown transiting 
from one state to another across time and, by doing so, provide valuable information not only in 
terms of general intensity (i.e. mean), but also of temporal dynamics (i.e. variability and 
flexibility). For instance, two trajectories could show the same mean with regard to both mood 
and attention, but show very different temporal patterns when time is taken into account.   
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Furthermore, although it is theoretically possible that all the states of the state space are 
visited with the same frequency (i.e., equiprobability), it is much more likely that one state (or a 
subset of states) is visited more often than others. In other words, it is more probable for a 
trajectory to enter a specific state than to exit (Heylighen, 1992). Such a state is defined as 
attractor. On the other hand, by applying the same logic, it is also possible that some states are 
constantly avoided, as their probability to be visited is null or close to zero. Consequently, they 
are considered as repellors.       
Research on rumination could clearly take great advantage from applying DST. Given a 
certain state space
1
, it would be interesting to investigate whether high ruminators compared to 
low ruminators tend to preferentially select a specific state over time (i.e. attractor), such as 
being internally focused and experiencing negative mood at the same time. Adopting this 
perspective would provide many benefits. For instance, not only would it be possible to ascertain 
what state absorbs ruminators most, but also what state high ruminators stay far away from.  
Despite these promising perspectives, no novelty is without costs. In fact, DST demands 
repeated measures and the availability of short but psychometrically sound measures of state 
rumination is pivotal. Unfortunately, so far most of the experience sampling studies, that 
potentially meet the DST requirements, have made use of a single item or very few items with 
unknown psychometric properties to measure rumination (e.g. Genet & Siemer, 2012). We here 
stress the necessity to adopt valid questionnaires that could be viable for repeated and reliable 
assessment of state rumination, such as the recently developed Momentary Ruminative 
Self-Focus Inventory (MRSI; Mor, Marchetti, & Koster, 2013).    
                                                             
1 This construct can be operationalized in different ways, such as by means of the state space grids (Hollenstein, 2007). 
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In sum, DST seems to be a very promising perspective both to propose new hypotheses 
and to re-interpret our current findings about rumination.  
4.2 Resting state studies 
Moments where individuals are not actively engaged in a task are contexts that may give 
rise to enhanced levels of ruminative thought. At the neural level, there is increasing research 
examining the relation between rumination and the DMN using resting state paradigms. 
However, given the very specific context and the loud background noise, at present it is unclear 
to what extent the fMRI research is representative of normal resting state (Gaab, Gabrieli, & 
Glover, 2008). Therefore, behavioral studies examining rumination during resting state are 
particularly promising. 
A recent behavioral study investigated whether resting state indeed provides an important 
context for ruminative self-focus and negative affect. In this study, individuals were at rest, while 
being randomly probed about their attentional focus. This focus could either be internally or 
externally oriented (Marchetti, Koster, & De Raedt, 2013). Being internally focused predicted 
increased levels of state rumination and, in turn, a worsening in mood. This rest-related toxic 
effect held only in people at high risk of depression. Moreover, a questionnaire study recently 
showed that the trait tendency to engage in daydreaming (as a proxy of resting state) specifically 
predicted individual levels of depression, but only to the extent to which both trait self-focus and 
brooding were involved too (Marchetti, Van de Putte, & Koster, 2013).  
In sum, given the absence of external stimulation and the proneness to become 
self-focused, resting state seems to be a promising field of inquiry for rumination. Nevertheless, 
new theoretical and empirical efforts are needed in order to account for and reconcile both 
neuropsychological and cognitive data.           
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4.3 Examining causal mechanisms of rumination  
The current chapter underscores that there are many different possible factors contributing 
to rumination. In order to stringently test the causal involvement of certain mechanisms of 
rumination an increasing number of studies is using experimental manipulations. Especially in 
the domain of information-processing, novel methodologies have been developed to manipulate 
basic cognitive processes (e.g., working memory) or cognitive biases (e.g., attentional bias for 
negative material). Such training procedures can be used either to induce certain processing styles 
in healthy samples or to reduce certain impairments in high ruminators or depressed individuals 
(see Koster et al., 2009). 
For instance, as discussed earlier, the link between cognitive impairments and rumination 
has been demonstrated in several correlational and prospective studies, but no clear inferences 
about the nature of this association can be made. It is possible that rumination depletes working 
memory resources (e.g. Philippot & Brutoux, 2008) or, alternatively, working memory 
impairments may lead to rumination (e.g., Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). To examine the functional 
role of cognitive impairments, the expected causal factor, being working memory functioning, 
has to be manipulated to subsequently monitor the effects on ruminations.  
Currently, there is an extensive debate about the efficacy of working memory training and 
the transferability of training effects (Shipstead et al., 2012). A major challenge of working 
memory training procedures is to obtain transfer of training to new tasks and contexts. In recent 
years, several studies have shown promising results using a working memory training paradigm. 
For instance Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, and Perrig (2008) used a dual n-back task to train 
working memory. This training involves monitoring and updating two streams of information 
which becomes gradually more difficult. They found, next to improvements on the training task, 
considerable gains in fluid intelligence scores compared to a control group. However, these 
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results have been challenged based on inappropriate designs (absence of an active control 
condition) and inappropriate transfer tasks that do not tap aspects of working memory (Shipstead 
et al., 2012).  
Although the efficacy of working memory training in improving working memory 
performance in healthy individuals is still under debate, working memory training did show 
interesting effects in the context of psychopathology or traits that are characterized by reduced 
working memory performance (Owens et al, 2013; Siegle et al., 2007). The results of these 
studies suggest that the dual n-back training might be a valid tool to manipulate working memory 
within an experimental design when individuals have impaired cognitive control. Such training 
has interesting potential to examine the influence of cognitive processing on rumination. 
Moreover, if working memory training proves to cause sustainable beneficial effects, it could 
complement existing treatments or (relapse) prevention programs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Rumination is a problematic self-regulation strategy that is associated with negative 
consequences on mood and cognition. We have discussed some of the key mechanisms 
explaining why individuals are susceptible to rumination. Major new developments in the study 
of rumination have been introduced which are likely to deepen our understanding of the 
dynamics of rumination and might also indicate new ways to reduce rumination. 
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